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Condensation
The obstetrical community should adopt the professional responsibility model of
obstetric ethics and abandon conceptually and clinically inadequate rights-based
models.

Short Title: The Professional Responsibility Model of Obstetric Ethics
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Abstract
Obstetric ethics is sometimes represented by polarized views. One extreme asserts the
rights of the rights of the fetus as the overwhelming ethical consideration. Another
extreme asserts the pregnant woman as the overwhelming ethical consideration. Both
assertions are overly simplistic. Such oversimplification is called reductionism. This
paper explains the fallacy of rights-based reductionism and two models of obstetric
ethics based on it and explains why the fetal rights reductionism model and the
pregnant woman's rights reductionism model result in conceptual and clinical failure and
therefore should be abandoned. The paper argues for the professional responsibility
model of obstetric ethics, which emphasizes the importance of medical science and
compassionate clinical care of both the pregnant and fetal patient. The result is that
responsible medical care overrides the extremes of clashing rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Every obstetrician is challenged by the clashing demands of fetal rights versus
maternal rights. 1-4 Their resulting polarization forces the obstetrician into the
unwelcome role of Odysseus struggling to avoid the mythical sea monsters of Scylla
and Charybdis, either one which could devour his ship and crew if he sailed too close.
To starboard, stand, like Scylla, the exclusive assertions of the rights of the fetus. s To
port, stand, just as unyielding, stand Charybdis, the exclusive assertions of the rights of
the pregnant woman. Ethical peril awaits the obstetrician who sails too close to either
extreme of rights, just as deadly peril did for Odysseus and his crew.
Models of obstetric ethics based on rights-based extremes commit the fallacy of
rights-based reductionism. The purposes of this paper are to explain the fallacy of
rights-based ethical reductionism and two models of obstetric ethics based on it, explain
why these models of rights-based reductionism are not acceptable, and put forward an
ethically justified and clinically applicable alternative, the professional responsibility
model. The professional responsibility model equips the obstetrician to successfully
navigate the perils of rights-based Scylla and Charybdis by focusing on professional
responsibility to and for patients. Just as Odysseus bore the responsibility to protect his
crew, the obstetrician bears the responsibility to protect both the pregnant and fetal
patient.
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THE FALLACY OF RIGHTS-BASED REDUCTIONISM
The fallacy of rights-based reductionism can be understood by analogy to the
fallacy of biological reductionism or oversimplification of scientific models of disease and
health. As an antidote to biological reductionism in medicine, George Engel made a
sentinel contribution with his introduction of the biopsychosocial concept of health and
disease.6-9 In his classic paper in Science Engel summarized the biomedical model:
The dominant model of disease is biomedical, with molecular biology its basic
scientific disCipline. It assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations
from the norm of measurable biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room
within its framework for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of
illness.... the biomedical model embraces both reductionism, the philosophic
view that complex phenomena are ultimately derived from a single primary
principle, and mind-body dualism, the doctrine that separates the mental from the
somatic. Here the reductionist primary principle is physicalistic; that is, it
assumes that the language of chemistry and physics will ultimately suffice to
explain biologic phenomena.?' pp. 39-40
The history of biological reductionism stands in contrast to traditional Chinese
medicine, based on the concept of qi, which was understood to have both physical and
spiritual components in an "incessant process of transformation.,,10 This history also
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stands in contrast to more holistic strands in the history of Westem medicine, e.g.,
naturopathy and homeopathy. Here we sketch a complicated history.11
Ancient Hippocratic physicians understood all diseases to be an interaction of the
four humors. According to the Hippocratic or Coan school of medicine, diseases
resulted from imbalances among blood, phlegm, black bile. and yellow bile. This theory
recognized the existence of environmental factors, such as prevailing wind direction, but
the explanation of the direct causes of disease and of their subsequent clinical
management, mainly by modest changes in diet and exercise and the use of mild
medications, appealed to what they took to be the biologically fundamental realities, the
humors. Later anatomy became fundamental and the focus shifted to the skeleton and
organs as the seat of diseases. Debates arose about more aggressive or "heroic"
treatment, especially surgery, to correct abnormal anatomy. Physiology, the science of
the functions of organs and then organ systems, then displaced anatomy as
fundamental. Medications and potions to correct symptoms of abnormal function
became increasingly important. The discovery of microbes led to a dramatic conceptual
shift. The seat of disease was now understood to be microscopic, which led to an
increased understanding of the pathophysiology and treatment of infections. We are
now well into the era of genomic medicine, in which the genome supersedes the
microbe as a senior partner in explaining the biological basis of health and disease.
Engel's concern was that equating health and disease with biological
fundamentals commits physicians to a clinically inadequate model of health and disease
that results in inadequate diagnosis, prevention, and treatment. For example, a married
6

woman of child-bearing years presents with a complaint of infertility. The biomedical
model focuses on the mechanisms of ovarian, tubal, uterine, and sperm function. The
biopsychosocial model includes this focus but rejects it as the exclusive focus, because
it is clinically incomplete and could result in unneeded, invasive, and expensive work-up
and assisted reproduction. A psychosocial assessment goes on to identify
psychological and social factors such as stress in the workplace or household, which
would be elicited only by a more complete history and would be missed by a work-up for
impaired anatomy of reproduction. The biopsychosocial model is clinically crucial
because it reminds the obstetrician that psychosocial, as well as anatomic and
pathophysiologic factors can result in reproductive failure.
As this example illustrates, Engel's concern was not the limitations of our
scientific knowledge at any given time about what is assumed biologically fundamental
in obstetrics. His point was that even a very sophisticated scientific fund of knowledge
about, for example, human reproduction, will be scientifically and therefore clinically
fallacious if it focuses only on the biological aspects of health and disease, e.g., the
basic science mechanisms of reproduction, mistaking these mechanisms of disease for
an adequate model of the totality of the disease. Incorporating the psychological and
social dimensions is required to have a clinically adequate model to guide obstetric care
and thereby avoid clinical tunnel vision. Fulfilling the requirements of the biomedical
model by finding an anatomic cause for infertility, may be very fulfilling for the physician
on a narrowly scientific basis, but not for the patient, whose complaint will remain
inadequately addressed if her infertility is also a function of unidentified and therefore
unmanaged psychosocial factors.
7

Engel's main point remains germane: the biomedical model is becomes a fallacy
when it is assumed to be complete. The remedy is to recognize that it is scientifically
and clinically incomplete and misleading. Comprehensive clinical judgment requires
attention to the clinically relevant biomedical and the clinically relevant psychosocial
aspects of pregnancy.
There is an analogous fallacious reductionism in obstetric ethics. The phrase,
"ethical reductionism," has been used,12 but not in a way that makes this analogy
explicit. The fallacy of ethical reductionism occurs when a model for ethics appeals to
one ethical concept in complex clinical circumstances that by their very nature require
consideration of complementary concepts. Rights-based reductionism in obstetric
ethics bases it exclusively on the rights of either the pregnant woman or the fetus and
ignore other clinically relevant ethical concepts. (Table 1)
The fallacy of right-based reductionism shapes the current abortion controversy.
Consider first the model of obstetric ethics based on unconditional fetal rights,
especially the right to life. The logic of this concept means that fetal rights always
override the rights of the pregnant woman. Termination of pregnancy at any gestational
age or for any reason is therefore impermissible, regardless of whether the pregnancy is
voluntary or not. Consider, next, the concept of the woman's unconditional rights,
especially the right to control her body. The logic of this concept means that the
pregnant woman's rights always override fetal rights. Termination of pregnancy is
therefore permissible at any gestational age. 13 (Table 1)
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Rights-talk has an undeniable appeal, because rights-talk seems so clear-cut:
one either has rights or one does not and, if one does, others must respect one's rights.
This is a false veneer of certainty masking the fact that there is significant controversy
about the nature and limits of fetal and maternal rights. Debating rights results in
intractable disputes, since rights are based on so many factors, including cultural,
political, and religious beliefs that do not lend themselves to compromise and are
peripheral to the physician-patient relationship.
It is obvious that a pregnant woman has rights, including an unconditional right to
control what happens to her body. There is enormous dispute about whether that right
should be understood to come with limits or with no exceptions throughout the entire
pregnancy. Professional integrity, for example, sets justified limits on the preferences of
pregnant women. 14,15
Claims that the fetus has rights, especially an unconditional right to life, are in
endless dispute. Some take the view that the fetus has no rights while others assert
strong rights of the fetus. Those who assert that the fetus has rights must - but often in
fact do not - recognize that the world's religions and their moral theologies are not in
agreement. 16-20 Nor are philosophers. 13 Indeed, there is no single authoritative
perspective from which the incompatible differences of these diverse views on fetal
rights can be resolved. 21 Such an authoritative source would have to be acceptable to
all of the competing accounts and conceptual frameworks. This is not achievable
because of an unavoidable fact. There is profound and irresolvable disagreement
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between different religious and cultural traditions, within such traditions, and between
religious and secular views on fetal rights.
The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model appears in the literature on
intrapartum management. This model asserts the unconditional right of the pregnant
woman to control her body and the implicit position that the fetus has no rights. The
pregnant woman has rights and her rights control performance of cesarean delivery: "
... the moral and legal primacy of the competent, informed pregnant woman in decision
making is overwhelming.,,22, p. 1213 A recent expression of this model takes what at first
seems a non-reductionist approach. Its authors acknowledge patient safety as a ''first
order issue"23, p. 341 and support what they call "restrictive guidelines" based on
protecting the life and health of pregnant women. 23 However, they abandon this more
nuanced approach in favor of an exclusive emphasis on the pregnant woman's rights
reductionism model when they assert: "Crucially, even when restrictive guidelines are
warranted the rights of pregnant women to bodily integrity must be maintained.,,23, p. 343
Some express the model in explicit terms, e.g., that "women have fully endowed rights
that do not diminish with conception, nor progressively degrade as pregnancy advances
to viability and birth."24, p. 318 Another example is the assertion of the pregnant woman's
autonomy as an "unrestricted negative right," i.e., an unconditional right to non
interference with refusal of cesarean delivery: "autonomy is an inter-relational right
ultimately there is no circumstance in which someone should be brought to an operating
room against their will."25 The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model also
grounds claims to the rights of pregnant women to have a clinically non-indicated
cesarean delivery. 26-28
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Rights-based reductionism models invite the unwary obstetrician to be satisfied
with an oversimplified solution: deciding whose rights win out in a zero-sum game 
those of the pregnant woman or those of the fetus. This solution, however it might
appeal to us in its simplicity, is ethically and clinically inadequate. Rights-based
reductionism in obstetric ethics is a fallacy.

THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL OF OBSTETRICS ETHICS
Because they are fallacious, rights-based reductionism models distort the
fundamental nature of the relationship of a physician to his or her patients, a
relationship of professional ethical obligations. (Table 1) The professional obligations of
the obstetrician-gynecologist originate in the ethical concept of medicine as a
profession. This concept was introduced into the history of medicine by two remarkable
British physician-ethicists: John Gregory (1724-1773) of Scotland and Thomas Percival
(1740-1804) of England. This concept requires the physician to make three
commitments: (1) becoming and remaining scientifically, ethically, and clinically
competent; (2) protecting and promoting the health-related and other interests of the
patient as the primary concern and motivation; and (3) preserving and strengthening
medicine as what Percival called a "public trust," a social institution that exists primarily
for the benefit of society not its members (in contrast to the concept of medicine as a
merchant gUild).29 The ethical concept of medicine as a profession makes assumption
of fiduciary responsibility the defining feature of the physician-patient relationship. In
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the professional responsibility model obstetricians have ethical obligations to both the
pregnant and fetal patient. 21 ,3o
There are two views on the health-related interests of the patient, both of which
must be taken into account. 21 The first perspective, which is dismissed by faliaciolJs
rights-based reductionism, is clinical. This clinical view is shaped by evidence-based
clinical judgment about diagnostic and therapeutic measures that are reliably expected
to result in a greater balance of clinical goods over clinical harms, understood in
biopsychosocial terms. This perspective is expressed by the principle of
beneficence.21 ,31 The second perspective is the patient's, shaped by her evidencebased and other judgments about which diagnostic and therapeutic interventions are
expected to result in a greater balance of clinical benefits over harms. This view is
expressed by the principle of respect for autonomy.19,31 Respect for the autonomy of
the pregnant woman who is a patient requires more than acknowledging and
implementing rights. Respect for autonomy should also be understood in
biopsychosocial terms: the physician should acknowledge and respect the integrity of
the patient's values and beliefs, especially those that she has for her pregnancy. An
individual's values and beliefs are drawn from multiple social sources, including one's
family upbringing, culture, and religion. These psychosocial sources of a patient's
values and beliefs should always be acknowledged and respected. Showing such
respect helps to promote a sense of psychological safety and security that contribute
significantly to a strong physician-patient relationship. Patients use their values and
beliefs to assess the medically reasonable alternatives that are offered or
recommended to them in the informed consent process, which should be used to
12

support the very important psychosocial values of trust and respect. The obstetrician
has both beneficence-based and autonomy-based obligations to the pregnant woman.
(Table 1)
The ethical concept of a human being becoming a patient is based on the
principle of beneficence and has two components. The human being is presented to a
physician and there exist clinical interventions that are reliably expected to clinically
benefit that human being. 21 A pregnant woman becomes a patient when she is
presented for obstetrical care. A fetus becomes a patient in a more complex fashion.
We have argued elsewhere that the viable fetus becomes a patient when the pregnant
woman is presented for obstetrical care. 21 The obstetrician has beneficence-based
obligations to the viable fetal patient. (Table 1) We have also argued elsewhere that
the pre-viable fetus becomes a patient when the pregnant woman is presented for
obstetrical care and the pregnant woman confers the moral status of being a patient on
her fetus, on the basis of her own values and beliefs. 21 When the pregnant confers the
status of patienthood on her fetus, the obstetrician has beneficence-based obligations to
it as a fetal patient. When she does not do so, no beneficence-based obligations to the
fetus exist. (Table 1)
Obstetricians can be certain when they have a professional relationship with a
patient and therefore responsibility to and for that patient: the pregnant woman or fetus
is presented to the obstetrician-gynecologist and there exist clinical interventions that
reliable expected to benefit the patient clinically. Both of these criteria for when a
human being becomes a patient are easy to apply clinically and universally applicable. 21
13

The fallacy of rights-based reductionism models is that they only appear to be
easy to apply clinically and to be universally applicable. Their apparent robustness
creates a veneer of certainty that, when subject to critical scrutiny, collapses. Consider
first the fetal rights reductionism model. Having rights is a function of the clinical reality
of having autonomy. In the most rigorous accounts of it having autonomy is achieved
only when an individual is capable of valuing himself or herself without regard to the
moral judgments of others. 32 This complex, very cognitively demanding self-awareness
and judgment require at the very least self-consciousness and social interaction. The
biological fact is that at all gestational ages the immature developmental status of the
fetus's central nervous system and its location in utero is such that it cannot yet support
the complexity of psychosocial activity that generates autonomy as a clinical reality;
This outcome is not a problem for the professional responsibility model, because the
ethical concept of the fetus as a patient makes no reference to the autonomy of the
fetus and therefore no reference to fetal rights. The fetal rights reductionism model,
despite its simplicity and powerful initial appeal, is fallacious because it leads obstetric
ethics into conceptual and clinical failure. This model therefore should be abandoned.
Consider next the pregnant woman's rights reductionism model. This model
requires the obstetrician to implement birth plans that unconditionally exclude cesarean
delivery or the unconditional right to planned home birth. This model eliminates the
obstetrician's beneficence-based obligations to both the pregnant and fetal patients and
therefore reduces the obstetrician to a mere automaton. This model also has absurd
implications, e.g., ruling out as potential paternalism strongly and repeatedly
recommending that pregnant women who abuse tobacco and alcohol seek help and be
14

supported in doing so. Respect for the pregnant woman's rights allows simply
accepting such clinically choices by patients because they have made clinically unwise,
but autonomous, choices. This is abandonment from the perspective of professional
responsibility for patients. The pregnant woman's rights reductionism model, despite its
simplicity and powerful appeal for many, is fallacious because it leads obstetric ethics to
conceptual and clinical failure. This model therefore also should be abandoned.

CONCLUSION
The Scylla and Charybdis of rights-based reductionism models should be
abandoned and replaced by the professional responsibility model. By basing obstetric
practice on the professional responsibility model of obstetric ethics, the obstetrician
creates a solid foundation for the care of the pregnant and fetal patient: the physician
patient relationship as a professional commitment.

15

References

1.

Brent RL. When does human life begin? A biologist's perspective. In Kurjak A,
Chervenak FA, eds. Controversies on the Beginning of Human Life. New Dehli:
Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers (P)(Ltd), 2008: 47-62.

2.

Pinkerton JV, Finnerty JJ. Resolving the clinical and ethical dilemma involved in
fetal-maternal conflicts. Am J Obstet Gynecol 1996; 175: 289-295.

3.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. An ethically justified practical approach to
offering, recommending, performing, and referring for induced abortion and
feticide. Am J Obstet Gynecol 2009; 201: 560.e1-6.

4.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. Professional integrity, respect for autonomy,
and the self-regulation of reproductive endocrinology. Am J Obstet Gynecol
2009; 201: 3-4.

5.

McCullough LB, Chervenak FA. A critical analysis of the concept and discourse
of 'unborn child'. Am J Bioeth 2008; 8: 34-39.

6.

Engel G. A unified concept of health and disease. IRE Transactions on Medical
Electronics 2009; 10.1109/IRET-ME.1960.5008004. Originally appeared in
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1960; 13: 48-57.

7.

Engel G. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine.
Science 1977; 196: 129-136. Reproduced in Holistic Med 1989; 4: 37-53.
16

8.

Engel G. The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model Am J Psychiatry
1980; 137: 535-544.

9.

Engel G. The biopsychosocial model and medical education. New Engl J Med
1982; 306: 802-805.

10.

Fan R. The discourses of Confucian medical ethics. In Baker RB, McCullough
LB, eds. The Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009: 195-201.

11.

Porter R. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1998.

12.

Zucker A. Moral monads and ethical reductionism. J Religious Ethics 1984; 12:
116-122.

13.

Johnson LSM. Abortion: II. Contemporary ethical and legal aspects: A. ethical
perspectives. In Post SG, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan
References USA 2004: 7-18.

14.

Brett AS, McCullough LB. When patients request specific interventions: defining
the limits of the physician's obligation. N Engl J Med 1986; 315: 1347-1351.

15.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB, Brent RL. The perils of the imperfect
expectation of the perfect baby. Am J Obstet Gynecol 2010; 203: 101.e1-5.

17

16.

Zoloth L. Abortion: III. religious traditions: a Jewish perspective. In Post SG, ed.,
Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan References USA 2004: 28-31.

17.

Cahill LS. Abortion: III. religious traditions: B. Roman Catholic perspectives. In
Post SG, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan References USA
2004: 31-35.

18.

Harrison BW. Abortion: III. religious traditions: C. Protestant perspectives. In Post
SG, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan References USA
2004: 35-39.

19.

Bakar O. Abortion: III. religious perspectives: D. Islamic perspectives. In Post
SG, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan References USA
2004: 39-43.

20.

Cole-Turner R. Embryo and fetus: IV. religious perspectives. In Post SG, ed.,
Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Macmillan References USA 2004: 732
740.

21.

McCullough LB, Chervenak FA. Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994.

22.

Annas GJ. Protecting the liberty of pregnant patients. N Engl J Med 1988; 316:
1213-1214.

18

23.

Lyerly AD, Little MO. Toward an ethically responsible approach to vaginal birth
after cesarean. Semin Perinatol2010; 34: 337-344.

24.

Minkoff H, Paltrow L. Obstetricians and the rights of pregnant women. Womens
Health (Lond Engl) 2007; 3: 315-319.

25.

Minkoff H. NIH Vaginal Birth after Cesarean: New Insights. National Institutes of
Health Consensus Development Conference, March 10-13, 2010. Page 6, Day 2
Discussion, avai lable at http://videocast.nih.gov/summarv.asp?Live=8408,
accessed April 11, 2011.

26.

Hogberg U, Lynoe N, Wulff M. Cesarean by choice? Empirical study of public
attitudes. Acta Obstet Gynecol Scand 2008; 87: 1301-1308.

27.

Buckley S. Reclaiming every woman's birthright. Midwifery Today Int Midwife
2010; 94: 40-41.

28.

Newnham H. Mother v fetus: who wins? Aust J Midwifery 2003; 16: 23-26.

29.

McCullough LB. The ethical concept of medicine as a profession: its origins in
modern medical ethics and implications for physicians. In Kenny N, Shelton W,
eds. Lost Virtue: Professional Character Development in Medical Education.
New York: Elsevier, 2006: 17-27.

19

30.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. The moral foundation of medical leadership: the
professional virtues of the physician as fiduciary of the patient. Am J Obstet
Gynecol2001; 184: 875-879.

31.

Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009.

32.

Schneewind JB. Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998.

20

Table 1: Three Models of Obstetric Ethics

Fetal Rights
Reductionism
Model

Professional
Responsibility
Model

Pregnant woman's
rights
systematically
secondary to fetal
rights

Autonomy-based
and beneficence
obligations

Pregnant
woman's
rights
systematically
override fetal
rights

Pre-viable Fetus

Fetal rights
systematica lIy
override woman's
rights

Beneficence-based
obligations, if the
status of
patienthood is
determined by the
pregnant woman

Fetal rights
systematically
secondary to
woman's
rights

Viable Fetus

Fetal rights
systematically
override woman's
rights

Beneficence-based
obligations

Fetal rights
systematically
secondary to
woman's
rights

Pregnant Woman

!

I
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Pregnant
Woman's
Rights
• Reductionism
Model

